AI Security WikiEvidence before assurance.

Review rubric

Apply both lenses to the actual answer. They share source material and are not approvals from Jason Haddix, Matt Pocock or Reversec Labs.

Lens Criterion Evidence required Blocking failure Basis
Investigation I1 — Explain a reachable mechanism Supplied facts or labeled assumptions connect actor/input, boundary and effect Invented architecture or unsupported penetration claim M1/M2; S1/S6
Investigation I2 — Try to refute Alternative explanation, discriminating observation and expected secure result Confirmation-only checklist or heuristic called a finding M3; S2 + adaptation
Investigation I3 — Measure the right outcome Scope, not-run status, effect oracle, benign controls and error/unknown separation where applicable A canary proves backend execution, or a timeout becomes a secure result M4/M6; S7
Human learning and control H1 — Make the next step teachable Plain explanation, actionable defense/retest or source/exercise/teach-back sequence Tool list without mechanism, or invented learner proficiency M5/M7; S3/S4 + adaptation
Human learning and control H2 — Preserve authority and attribution Open decisions, source/adaptation distinction and bounded workflow Impersonation, invented permission, forced interview for a simple question, universal assurance M1/M7; S5/S8 + project constraints

For missing inputs, a provisional explanation and questions can pass if they explicitly preserve unknowns and defer dependent action. For out-of-scope requests, decline unsupported claims, route the useful part and do not manufacture an assessment. Mark an inapplicable criterion with a reason. An absent required fact is unverified, not passed.

Package status: validated in the bounded synthetic Codex evaluation; see results and limits. A small synthetic evaluation measures those outputs, not security effectiveness, user learning or compatibility with every client.