AI Security WikiEvidence before assurance.

Methods and decision trail

ID Condition Action Observable check Exception Evidence
M1 Any assessment request Establish use case, stakeholders, datasets, applications, obligations and authorized scope Explicit intake and target boundaries Missing input permits only a provisional plan S2 §1.2 pp. 8–10; S4 intake; documented workflow with project authorization adaptation
M2 System type is not fully established Identify all seven deployment features and their yes/no/unknown state Classification rationale and unresolved questions A mixed system selects multiple patterns S1 risk columns H–N; S2 p. 9; S4 multiselect; documented taxonomy with tri-state adaptation
M3 Deployment patterns are known Union source Yes risks and deduplicate their forward-linked controls Selected risk IDs, matching columns, control IDs and row citations Blanks stay unspecified; No does not prove absence S1 risk columns E and H–N; S4 filtering; documented selection, project provenance implementation
M4 Source and architecture conflict Preserve original mapping and add a separately labelled architecture review Source deviation, rationale and owner are explicit Never silently rewrite source truth S1 observed 9.1 matrix and asymmetric links; project adaptation
M5 A plausible risk is selected Define a falsifiable hypothesis, inspect evidence, then test synthetic cases with legitimate comparisons Expected/observed results, versions, authorization and artifact references No permission for active tests means evidence review only S2 pp. 99–103 automated/manual testing; project evidence and authorization adaptation
M6 Tools, MCP, memory or delegation cross trust boundaries Trace identity, consent, scope, token audience, state ownership and egress at each hop Boundary-specific denial evidence and attributable effects Local stdio and remote OAuth have different deployment requirements S3 component-13 organization; S5 named security sections; documented threats with project checklist adaptation
M7 Evidence supports a control gap Propose a minimal change, owner, rollback and acceptance test; retest prohibited and legitimate behavior Evidence of enforcement and stated residual risk Control description or product presence never counts as a passed test S1 mitigation descriptions; S2 p. 10 and pp. 100–103; project remediation contract
M8 User asks to understand the failure Explain mechanism, observed/hypothetical impact, correction and verification in the user’s language Clear evidence labels, concrete example and source IDs No verified observation means explain a possible risk, not a confirmed incident S2 intended audiences pp. 7–8; project communication adaptation

Resolving tensions

Source filtering (M3) offers reproducibility; architecture review (M4) prevents false exclusions. Keep both views with provenance. A guardrail recommendation (S1 DASF-54) does not override the downstream authorization requirements (M6/S5). Traceability (S1 DASF-65) is implemented with observable decisions and effects; private hidden model reasoning is not required. Full coverage never overrides the authorized testing boundary (M1/M5).