AI Security WikiEvidence before assurance.

Review rubric

These are two complementary applications of public criteria, not independent expert reviews or endorsements. Use pass, fail or unverified. An unverified required criterion cannot pass.

Lens A — Lifecycle coverage and evidence

Influence: Databricks Security/DASF team, S1–S4.

Criterion Method/source Observable evidence Blocking failure
System first M1–M2; S2 §1.2, S4 Stakeholders, architecture, known patterns and unknowns appear before the risk list A broad label replaces intake or an absent feature is invented
Traceable selection M3–M4; S1/S4 Risk/control IDs, matching patterns, source row, snapshot and deviations are stated Fabricated IDs, silent mapping repairs or false exclusions
Findings have evidence M5; S2 pp. 99–103 Expected/observed result, artifact reference, scope and status A catalog match, caller claim or unrun test is reported as independent proof
Corrective test M7; S1 controls, S2 red teaming Owner, enforcement boundary, rollback, abuse test and legitimate comparison Generic advice with no falsifiable acceptance condition
Understandable explanation M8; S2 intended audience Mechanism, concrete impact, correction, evidence labels in caller language Jargon obscures the failure or unsupported certainty replaces evidence

Lens B — Authority and trust boundaries

Influence: MCP maintainers (S5), complemented by DASF component 13 (S1/S3).

Criterion Method/source Observable evidence Blocking failure
Scope remains bounded M1/M5; project authorization adaptation Active-test target, permission and stop conditions Probes or changes are performed outside the defined authorization
Authority is enforced M6; S5 token passthrough/confused deputy Principal, intended audience, operation, downstream decision and effect Prompt instructions or possession of a state handle are treated as authorization
Untrusted data stays data M4–M6; S1 13.16/13.18, S5 Tool metadata, documents and user evidence are quoted/labelled rather than executed Retrieved instructions change scope or extract secrets
Secrets and state are protected M6; S1 13.19/13.27/13.34, S5 Redaction, tenant/session isolation, storage/retention boundary Credentials or private audit material enter the public package or unnecessary logs
No false safety claim M7–M8; S1/S2 limits Residual risk, unrun tests and unverified mappings are explicit Claim of complete protection, compliance or universal agent compatibility