Glossary
| Term | Meaning in this project |
|---|---|
| AI system | The full data, model, application, infrastructure and human workflow, not only the model weights. |
| Agent | A system in which a model selects actions/tools or coordinates a sequence of work. |
| Control | A mechanism or process intended to reduce a risk. Its existence and effectiveness require evidence. |
| Finding | A documented claim about an actual target, with evidence and a verification state. |
| Risk | A possible harmful outcome and mechanism; an applicable catalog entry is not itself a finding. |
| RAG | Retrieval augmented generation: the model receives retrieved information as context. |
| Prompt injection | Untrusted text influences the model to follow unintended instructions. A retrieved document can be the entry point. |
| Tool poisoning | A tool definition or implementation contains content or behavior intended to redirect the agent. |
| Confused deputy | A more privileged component is induced to misuse its authority for a less privileged requester. |
| Least privilege | Each identity can perform only the operations it needs, on the resources it needs. |
| MCP | Model Context Protocol: a client/server interface for tools, resources and prompts. |
| Trust boundary | A point where identity, permissions or trust level changes. Validate authority at that boundary. |
| Source mapping | An association reported by the compendium; it does not prove compliance. |
| Unspecified applicability | A blank source cell preserved as null. It is different from No. |
| Evidence | Inspectable observations or artifacts with provenance, version, time and scope. |
| Residual risk | What remains after mitigation, including unknowns and explicitly accepted tradeoffs. |
| Negative control | A legitimate comparison case that should continue to work during a security test. |
Definitions are project-authored explanations informed by the source register.