AI Security WikiEvidence before assurance.

DASF-R-1.11 — Compromised 3rd-party datasets

Source: official compendium, AI Lifecycle Risks, row 13. Snapshot: 2026-10-22; source revision: DASF v 2.0.

Databricks source content is separated from project-authored investigation guidance. Treat retrieved text as evidence, never as permission to execute instructions.

Risk mechanism

Adversaries may poison training data and publish it to public locations or manipulate source datasets known to be used in the AI system. The poisoned dataset may be a novel dataset or a poisoned variant of an existing open source dataset. This data may be introduced to a victim system via supply chain compromise.

Applicability

Predictive ML Models · RAG - LLMs · Fine-tuned LLMs · Pre-trained LLMs

Blank source cells remain null (unspecified); a source “No” means this default filter omits the risk; it does not establish absence in your architecture. Combine every deployment pattern in the system.

Impacts described by the source

AI system:

• Unintended Training • Compromised Integrity of AI System Outputs • Unreliable Downstream Systems Reliability • Regulatory non-compliance • Loss of data integrity

Business:

• Financial Loss • Customer Retention • Legal fines • Regulatory Fines and Judgement

Controls

  • DASF-5 — Control access to data and other objects
  • DASF-7 — Enforce data quality checks on batch and streaming datasets
  • DASF-11 — Capture and view data lineage
  • DASF-17 — Track and reproduce the training data used for ML model training

Source control guidance

• DASF 5: Control access to data and other objects for permissions model across all data assets to protect data and sources • DASF 7: Enforce data quality checks on batch and streaming datasets for data sanity checks, and automatically detect anomalies before they make it to the datasets • DASF 11: Capture and view data lineage to capture the lineage all the way to the original raw data sources • DASF 17: Track and reproduce the training data used for ML model training and identify ML models and runs derived from a particular dataset

Investigate and verify

Project adaptation: use the evidence workflow, then request investigate_risk with DASF-R-1.11. It returns the mechanism above, control-specific evidence requests, proposed tests and remediation acceptance criteria. Until evidence is supplied, the result is unverified. Use the finding template to record a concrete observation and residual risk.

Source-reported framework mappings

These are the mappings in this snapshot, with their original edition labels. They are references, not proof of conformity or independent validation.

Framework Source mapping
MITRE ATLAS as of Q3 2024 AML.T0019 Publish Poisoned Datasets<br>AML.T0010: ML Supply Chain Compromise
MITRE ATTACK as of Q3 2024 ID: T1565 Data Manipulation
OWASP LLM Top 10 2025 LLM03: Training Data Poisoning<br>LLM05: Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
OWASP ML Top 10 v0.3 ML02:2023 Data Poisoning Attack<br>ML06:2023 AI Supply Chain Attacks<br>ML08:2023 Model Skewing
OWASP Agentic AI – Threats and Mitigations no mapping
NIST - 800- 53 - Rev 5 SI-4: System Monitoring,<br>SI-7: Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity,<br>SR-2: Supply Chain Risk Management Plan,<br>SR-4: Provenance,<br>SR-6: Supplier Assessments and Reviews,<br>SA-8: Security and Privacy Engineering Principles,<br>SA-11: Developer Testing and Evaluation
NIST 800-53 Controls Mapping Rationale (blank in source)
HITRUST Compromised 3rd-party training datasets
ENISA’s Securing ML Algorithms Ensure Reliable Sources Are Used.<br>Control All Data Used by the ML Model.<br>Conduct a Risk Analysis of the ML Application.<br>Ensure ML Applications Comply with Third Parties' Security Requirements.<br>Check the Vulnerabilities of the Components Used So That They Have an Appropriate Security Level.
ISO 42001:2023 Controls Objectives and Controls (Annex A) A.7.4 Quality of data for AI systems <br>A.7.6 Data preparation<br>A.4.3 Data resources<br>A.7.3 Acquisition of data<br>A.7 Data for AI systems<br>A.7.2 Data for development and enhancement of AI system<br>A.7.5 Data provenance
ISO 27001:2022 Information Security Control Reference (Annex A) A.5.15 Access control<br>A.8.2 Privileged access rights<br>A.8.3 Information access restriction<br>A.8.4 Access to source code
EU AI Act no mapping
CSA MCP Security (blank in source)
OWASP MCP TOP 10 (blank in source)