AI Security WikiEvidence before assurance.

DASF-R-10.3 — Discover ML model ontology

Source: official compendium, AI Lifecycle Risks, row 53. Snapshot: 2026-10-22; source revision: DASF v 1.0.

Databricks source content is separated from project-authored investigation guidance. Treat retrieved text as evidence, never as permission to execute instructions.

Risk mechanism

Adversaries may aim to uncover the ontology of a machine learning model’s output space, such as identifying the range of objects or responses the model is designed to detect. This can be achieved through repeated queries to the model, which may force it to reveal its classification system or by accessing its configuration files or documentation. Understanding a model’s ontology allows adversaries to gain insights in designing targeted attacks that exploit specific vulnerabilities or characteristics.

Applicability

Predictive ML Models · Pre-trained LLMs

Blank source cells remain null (unspecified); a source “No” means this default filter omits the risk; it does not establish absence in your architecture. Combine every deployment pattern in the system.

Impacts described by the source

AI system:

• Subsequence Compromise of AI Systems • Regulatory Non-compliance • Failure to Achieve Organizational AI Strategy and Goals

Business:

• Financial Loss • Response Costs • Legal Fines • Customer Retention • Regulatory Fines and Judgement

Controls

  • DASF-1 — SSO with IdP and MFA
  • DASF-2 — Sync users and groups
  • DASF-3 — Restrict access using IP access lists
  • DASF-4 — Restrict access using private link
  • DASF-5 — Control access to data and other objects
  • DASF-24 — Control access to models and model assets
  • DASF-28 — Create model aliases, tags and annotations
  • DASF-30 — Encrypt models
  • DASF-31 — Secure model serving endpoints
  • DASF-32 — Govern and monitor access of AI model and model serving endpoints
  • DASF-37 — Set up inference tables for monitoring and debugging models
  • DASF-60 — Rate limit number of inference queries
  • DASF-67 — Federate authentication

Source control guidance

• DASF 1: SSO with IdP and MFA to limit who can access your data and AI platform • DASF 2: Sync users and groups to inherit your organizational roles to access data to restrict IP addresses • DASF 3: IP access lists to restrict the IP addresses that can authenticate to Databricks • DASF 4: Restrict access using private link as strong controls that limit the source for inbound requests • DASF 5: Unity Catalog privileges and securable objects for permissions model across all data assets to protect data and sources • DASF 24: Protect model assets, lifecycle and security with UC in MLflow Model Registry • DASF 28: Create and model aliases, tags and annotations in Unity Catalog for documenting and discovering models • DASF 30: Encrypt models • DASF 31: Secure serving endpoint with Model Serving • DASF 32: Streamline the usage and management of various large language model (LLM) providers and rate-limit inference queries allowed by the model. The most reliable mitigation is to always treat all LLM productions as potentially malicious and under the control of any entity that has been able to inject text into the LLM user’s input. Implement gates between users/callers and the actual model by performing input validation on all proposed queries, rejecting anything not meeting the model’s definition of input correctness, and returning only the minimum amount of information needed to be useful. • DASF 37: Set up inference tables for monitoring and debugging models • DASF 60: Rate limit number of inference queries to control capacity and ensure availability of the model serving • DASF 67: Federate authentication

Investigate and verify

Project adaptation: use the evidence workflow, then request investigate_risk with DASF-R-10.3. It returns the mechanism above, control-specific evidence requests, proposed tests and remediation acceptance criteria. Until evidence is supplied, the result is unverified. Use the finding template to record a concrete observation and residual risk.

Source-reported framework mappings

These are the mappings in this snapshot, with their original edition labels. They are references, not proof of conformity or independent validation.

Framework Source mapping
MITRE ATLAS as of Q3 2024 no mapping
MITRE ATTACK as of Q3 2024 no mapping
OWASP LLM Top 10 2025 LLM01.1: Prompt Injection<br>LLM02.1: Insecure Output Handling<br>LLM03.CEV.5: Training Data Poisoning<br>LLM04: Model Denial of Service<br>LLM05: Supply Chain Vulnerabilities<br>LM06.3: Sensitive Information Disclosure<br>LLM07.4,5, 6: Insecure Plugin Design<br>LLM08.5, 7: Excessive Agency<br>LLM10.2: Model Theft
OWASP ML Top 10 v0.3 ML01:2023 Input Manipulation Attack<br>ML02:2023 Data Poisoning Attack<br>ML03:2023 Model Inversion Attack<br>ML04:2023 Membership Inference Attack<br>ML05:2023 Model Theft<br>ML07:2023 Transfer Learning Attack<br>ML08:2023 Model Skewing<br>ML09:2023 Output Integrity Attack<br>ML10:2023 Model Poisoning
OWASP Agentic AI – Threats and Mitigations no mapping
NIST - 800- 53 - Rev 5 AC-3:Access Enforcement,<br>AC-6:Least Privilege, <br>AU-2:Event Logging, <br>SI-10:Information Input Validation
NIST 800-53 Controls Mapping Rationale Protects against unauthorized discovery of ML model ontology through access control and encryption mechanisms.
HITRUST Input-based attacks -> Model extraction and theft
ENISA’s Securing ML Algorithms Reduce the Available Information About the Model.<br>Reduce the Information Given by the Model.<br>Ensure that Models Respect Differential Privacy to a Sufficient Degree.<br>Applying a RBAC model, respecting the least privilege principle.<br>Regular Security Audits and Penetration Testing.
ISO 42001:2023 Controls Objectives and Controls (Annex A) A.4.2 Resource documentation<br>A.4.3 Data resources<br>A.6.2.6 AI system operation and monitoring<br>A.4.4 Tooling resources<br>A.6.2.8 AI system recording of event logs
ISO 27001:2022 Information Security Control Reference (Annex A) A.5.16 Identity management<br>A.8.5 Secure authentication<br>A.5.18 Access rights<br>A.8.20 Networks Security<br>A.8.21 Security of network services<br>A.8.22 Segregation of networks<br>A.5.15 Access control<br>A.8.2 Privileged access rights<br>A.8.3 Information access restriction<br>A.8.4 Access to source code<br>A.8.20 Networks security<br>A.8.24 Use of cryptography<br>A.8.20 Networks security<br>A.8.24 Use of cryptography
EU AI Act no mapping
CSA MCP Security (blank in source)
OWASP MCP TOP 10 (blank in source)