AI Security WikiEvidence before assurance.

DASF-R-13.1 — Memory Poisoning

Source: official compendium, AI Lifecycle Risks, row 65. Snapshot: 2026-10-22; source revision: DASF v 3.0.

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Risk mechanism

Memory Poisoning involves exploiting an AI's memory systems, both short and long-term, to introduce malicious or false data and exploit the agent’s context. This can lead to altered decision-making and unauthorized operations.

Applicability

Agentic AI

Blank source cells remain null (unspecified); a source “No” means this default filter omits the risk; it does not establish absence in your architecture. Combine every deployment pattern in the system.

Impacts described by the source

AI system:

• Unauthorised Alteration of AI System Outputs • Unauthorised Access to Private Information • Unintended Model Outputs • Reduced Organisation Trust in Model Effectiveness and Performance • Regulatory Non-compliance • Failure to Achieve Organizational AI Strategy and Goals

Business:

• Financial Loss • Regulatory Fines and Judgement • Legal Fines • Customer Retention

Controls

  • DASF-1 — SSO with IdP and MFA
  • DASF-2 — Sync users and groups
  • DASF-3 — Restrict access using IP access lists
  • DASF-4 — Restrict access using private link
  • DASF-5 — Control access to data and other objects
  • DASF-24 — Control access to models and model assets
  • DASF-31 — Secure model serving endpoints
  • DASF-34 — Run models in multiple layers of isolation
  • DASF-37 — Set up inference tables for monitoring and debugging models
  • DASF-46 — Store and retrieve embeddings securely
  • DASF-54 — Implement AI guardrails
  • DASF-55 — Monitor audit logs
  • DASF-64 — Limit access from AI models and agents
  • DASF-65 — Implement end-to-end AI traceability
  • DASF-67 — Federate authentication
  • DASF-71 — Log and register AI agents
  • DASF-72 — Securely store and reuse agent state

Source control guidance

• DASF 1: SSO with IdP and MFA to limit who can access your data and AI platform • DASF 2: Sync users and groups to inherit your organizational roles to access data • DASF 3: Restrict access using IP access lists that can authenticate to your data and AI platform • DASF 4: Restrict access using private link as strong controls that limit the source for inbound requests • DASF 5: Control access to data and other objects for permissions model across all data assets to protect data and sources • DASF 24: Control access to models and model assets, AI agents • DASF 31: Secure model serving endpoints • DASF 34: Run models and agents in multiple layers of isolation with unprivileged VMs and network segregation. Protects back-end internal systems. Implement memory content validation, session isolation, robust authentication mechanisms for memory access, anomaly detection systems, and regular memory sanitization routines. • DASF 37: Set up inference tables for monitoring and debugging prompts • DASF 46: Store and retrieve embeddings securely to protect vector store memory — a primary long-term memory store for agents — from unauthorized access and injection • DASF 54: Implement LLM guardrails to prevent unwanted and unsafe data in requests and responses • DASF 55: Monitor audit logs to detect unauthorized reads and writes to agent memory stores • DASF 64: Limit access from AI models and agents, applying least privilege to what agents can read from and write to memory, limiting the blast radius of a poisoning attempt • DASF 65: Implement end-to-end AI traceability • DASF 67: Federate authentication • DASF 71: Log and register AI agents to provide traceability on which agent modified memory, enabling attribution and forensics • DASF 72: Securely store and reuse agent state to protect short-term agent memory (conversation history, decision logs, temporary tasks) within a governed perimeter rather than insecure external stores

Additional controls to consider: Please see the companion compendium document for a collection of third-party tools.

Investigate and verify

Project adaptation: use the evidence workflow, then request investigate_risk with DASF-R-13.1. It returns the mechanism above, control-specific evidence requests, proposed tests and remediation acceptance criteria. Until evidence is supplied, the result is unverified. Use the finding template to record a concrete observation and residual risk.

Source-reported framework mappings

These are the mappings in this snapshot, with their original edition labels. They are references, not proof of conformity or independent validation.

Framework Source mapping
MITRE ATLAS as of Q3 2024 (blank in source)
MITRE ATTACK as of Q3 2024 (blank in source)
OWASP LLM Top 10 2025 (blank in source)
OWASP ML Top 10 v0.3 (blank in source)
OWASP Agentic AI – Threats and Mitigations T1. Memory Poisoning
NIST - 800- 53 - Rev 5 (blank in source)
NIST 800-53 Controls Mapping Rationale (blank in source)
HITRUST (blank in source)
ENISA’s Securing ML Algorithms (blank in source)
ISO 42001:2023 Controls Objectives and Controls (Annex A) (blank in source)
ISO 27001:2022 Information Security Control Reference (Annex A) (blank in source)
EU AI Act (blank in source)
CSA MCP Security (blank in source)
OWASP MCP TOP 10 (blank in source)