AI Security WikiEvidence before assurance.

DASF-R-7.3 — ML Supply chain vulnerabilities

Source: official compendium, AI Lifecycle Risks, row 32. Snapshot: 2026-10-22; source revision: DASF v 1.0.

Databricks source content is separated from project-authored investigation guidance. Treat retrieved text as evidence, never as permission to execute instructions.

Risk mechanism

Due to the extensive data, skills and computational resources required to train machine learning algorithms, it’s common practice to reuse and slightly modify models developed by large corporations. For example, ResNet, a popular image recognition model from Microsoft, is often adapted for customer-specific tasks. These models are curated in a Model Zoo (Caffe hosts popular image recognition models) or hosted by third-party ML SaaS (OpenAI LLMs are an example). In this attack, the adversary attacks the models hosted in Caffe, thereby poisoning the well for anyone else. Adversaries can also host specialized models that will receive less scrutiny, akin to watering hole attacks.

Applicability

Predictive ML Models · Fine-tuned LLMs · Pre-trained LLMs · External Models

Blank source cells remain null (unspecified); a source “No” means this default filter omits the risk; it does not establish absence in your architecture. Combine every deployment pattern in the system.

Impacts described by the source

AI system:

• Compromise of AI System • Uncontrolled AI System Models • Regulatory Non-compliance • Failure to Achieve Organizational AI Strategy and Goals

Business:

• Financial Loss • Response Costs • Legal Fines • Customer Retention • Regulatory Fines and Judgement

Controls

  • DASF-22 — Build models with all representative, accurate and relevant data sources
  • DASF-27 — Pretrain a large language model (LLM)
  • DASF-42 — Employ data-centric MLOps and LLMOps
  • DASF-45 — Evaluate models
  • DASF-48 — Use hardened Runtime for Machine Learning
  • DASF-53 — Third-party library control
  • DASF-56 — Restrict outbound connections from models

Source control guidance

• DASF 22: Build models with all representative, accurate and relevant data sources to minimize third-party dependencies for models and data where possible • DASF 27: Pretrain a large language model (LLM) on your own IP • DASF 42: Data-centric MLOps and LLMOps promote models as code using CI/CD. Scan third-party models continuously to identify hidden cybersecurity risks and threats such as malware, vulnerabilities and integrity issues to detect possible signs of malicious activity, including malware, tampering and backdoors. See resources section for third-party tools. • DASF 45: Evaluate models and validate (aka, stress testing) to verify reported function and disclosed weaknesses in the models • DASF 48: Use hardened runtime for machine learning • DASF 53: Third-party library control • DASF 56: Restrict outbound connections from models to prevent attacks to exfiltrate data, inference requests and responses

Additional controls to consider: Please see the companion compendium document for a collection of third-party tools.

Investigate and verify

Project adaptation: use the evidence workflow, then request investigate_risk with DASF-R-7.3. It returns the mechanism above, control-specific evidence requests, proposed tests and remediation acceptance criteria. Until evidence is supplied, the result is unverified. Use the finding template to record a concrete observation and residual risk.

Source-reported framework mappings

These are the mappings in this snapshot, with their original edition labels. They are references, not proof of conformity or independent validation.

Framework Source mapping
MITRE ATLAS as of Q3 2024 AML.TA0003: Resource Development - creating, purchasing, or compromising/stealing resources<br>AML.T0002: Acquire Public ML Artifacts<br>AML.T0017.000: Adversarial ML Attacks<br>AML.T0010: ML Supply Chain Compromise<br>AML.T0010.003: ML Supply Chain Model Compromise<br>AML.T0011.000: Unsafe ML Artifacts
MITRE ATTACK as of Q3 2024 ID: T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary<br>ID: T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
OWASP LLM Top 10 2025 LLM01: Prompt Injection<br>LLM03: Training Data Poisoning<br>LLM05: Supply Chain Vulnerabilities<br>LLM06.3: Sensitive Information Disclosure<br>LLM10: Model Theft
OWASP ML Top 10 v0.3 ML08:2023 Model Skewing
OWASP Agentic AI – Threats and Mitigations no mapping
NIST - 800- 53 - Rev 5 SR-2:Supply Chain Risk Management Plan, <br>SR-3:Supply Chain Controls and Processes, <br>SR-6:Supplier Assessments and Reviews, <br>SR-10:Inspection of Systems or Components, <br>SR-11:Component Authenticity, <br>SA-4:Acquisition Process, <br>SA-8:Security and Privacy Engineering Principles, <br>RA-3:Risk Assessment
NIST 800-53 Controls Mapping Rationale Protects against risks in the supply chain through boundary protection and integrity monitoring.
HITRUST Supply chain attacks -> Compromised 3rd-party models or code
ENISA’s Securing ML Algorithms Ensure ML Applications Comply with Security Policies.<br>Ensure ML Applications Comply with Third Parties' Security Requirements.<br>Include ML Applications in Asset Management Processes.<br>Check the Vulnerabilities of the Components Used so that they Have an Appropriate Security Level.<br>Conduct a Risk Analysis of the ML Application.<br>Ensure ML Projects Follow the Global Process for Integrating Security into Projects.<br>Implement Processes to Maintain Security Levels of ML Components over Time.<br>Reduce the Available Information About the Model.
ISO 42001:2023 Controls Objectives and Controls (Annex A) A.6.2.4 AI system verification and validation<br>A.7 Data for AI systems<br>A.7.2 Data for development and enhancement of AI system<br>A.7.3 Acquisition of data<br>A.7.4 Quality of data for AI systems<br>A.7.5 Data provenance<br>A.7.6 Data preparation<br>A.9 Use of AI systems<br>A.9.2 Processes for responsible use of AI systems<br>A.9.3 Objectives for responsible use of AI system<br>A.9.4 Intended use of the AI system<br>A.4.3 Data resources<br>A.6.1.2 Objectives for responsible development of AI system<br>A.6.1.3 Processes for responsible design and development of AI systems<br>A.6.2.3 Documentation of AI system design and development<br>A.6.2 AI system life cycle<br>A.6.2.2 AI system requirements and specification<br>A.6.2.5 AI system deployment<br>A.6.2.6 AI system operation and monitoring<br>A.6.2.8 AI system recording of event logs<br>A.4.4 Tooling resources
ISO 27001:2022 Information Security Control Reference (Annex A) A.8.9 Configuration management<br>A.8.25 Secure development life cycle<br>A.8.15 Logging<br>A.8.16 Monitoring Activities
EU AI Act Article 15.5: Accuracy, Robustness and Cybersecurity
CSA MCP Security (blank in source)
OWASP MCP TOP 10 (blank in source)